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Abstract 
This study examines a recent change in voluntary disclosure by investigating the issuance of 
management cash flow forecasts for a sample of 690 UK non-financial firm-year observations 
which are drawn from the top 500 UK listed firms by total market capitalization as listed by 
Financial Times on 30 March 2007. Automated content analysis is used to search for cash flow 
forecasts in annual reports narratives using QSR NVivo 8. The results of regression analysis 
provide support for institutional theory that companies try to imitate the disclosure practices of 
other companies in the same industry. Also, the results document that operating cash flow, 
industry behaviour, cross-listing, and company size are positively and significantly related to 
disclosure of cash flow forecasts, whereas performance and competition rate are negatively and 
significantly related to disclosure of cash flow forecasts. However, the results fail to find any 
significant relationship between normative or coercive isomorphism proxies and disclosure of 
cash flow forecasts.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Narrative disclosure, Cash flow forecasts, Industry behaviour, Imitation, Leadership, 
mimetic isomorphism, normative isomorphism, coercive isomorphism, automated content 
analysis, institutional theory, forward-looking information, panel data, QSR NVivo 8. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent years have seen major changes in financial reporting with reporting becoming 
increasingly user driven rather than producer driven (Beattie, 2000). In other words, financial 
reporting is not only about the presentation of historical financial statements and related notes, 
but it is also about the discussion and explanation of the company’s activities and future 
prospects through the use of narrative sections. This has led to significant increases in the 
disclosure of information including the disclosure of cash flow forecasts although the specific 
determinants of such disclosure practices remain unclear. 
 
   
Previous studies examined the determinants of forward looking information based primarily on 
propositions provided by agency or information asymmetry theories (e.g., Clarkson et al., 1994, 
1999; Cahan and Hossain, 1996; Johnson et al., 2001; Robb et al., 2001; Kent and Ung, 2003; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Hossain et al., 2005; Celik et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Bozzolan and 
Mazzola, 2007). However, institutional theory has begun to focus more directly on institutional 
phenomena within organisations (Moll et al., 2006). Specifically, it argues that organisations 
could be influenced by cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities external to 
the firm which may provide consistent explanations of disclosure practices (Scott, 1995).  
 
Based on this proposition, determinants of cash flow forecasts information are likely to be 
subject to two types of influence: company specific information asymmetry or agency 
characteristics (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and sector, country or market wide institutional factors 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Thus, a multi-theoretical lens based on both information 
asymmetry and institutional theories is used in this study in order to identify potentially new 
determinants of the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts over the period of change in UK 
Operating and Financial Review (OFR) regulation from 2004-2006.  This time window 
incorporates the period from 1 January 2004 to 31 March 2005, a period free of regulation, 
mandatory regulation from 1 April 2005 to 12 January 2006, and another period of voluntary 
disclosure in the rest of 2006.  
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Our paper makes a major contribution to the literature on cash flow forecasts disclosure. It 
identifies the main managers’ incentives for using these forecasts. In particular, it examines the 
degree to which institutional and information asymmetry variables drive managers to issue these 
forecasts. Exploring the impact of the change of the OFR regulation on levels of cash flow 
forecasts is a unique feature of this paper. The paper makes a secondary contribution in terms of 
the research deign. We use QSR NVivo (8) to text-search a large-scale sample of annual reports 
over a three-year period. This helps us to automatically identify the number of sentences that are 
related to cash follow forecasts disclosure with low cost and effort.   
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews previous studies and outlines the 
study’s hypotheses Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes and suggests line for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Previous studies in the accounting literature have focused on corporate characteristics to examine 
managers’ incentive to release additional information. However, different measurements of the 
extent of corporate disclosures and alternative firm characteristics were employed. Earlier studies 
conducted on determinants of forward-looking (FL) information have concentrated on the 
earnings forecast as a proxy for FL information. For example, Frankel et al. (1995) used a 
dichotomous measure indicating whether a company issued earnings forecasts or not in the Dow 
Jones Retrieval Service of 1880 firm-observations over the years of 1980-1983. They found that 
earnings forecasts are positively related to the need for external funds and company size. 
Clarkson et al. (1994) concentrated on forecasts of good news on earnings. They found a positive 
relationship between the earnings forecast and capitals’ needs and corporate size, but negative 
relationships between the earnings forecasts and the threat of competitors, earnings volatility, 
and earnings shock. Similar results were found in Australia, by Kent and Ung (2003) who 
likewise found that larger companies with less volatile earnings were more likely to provide 
earnings forecasts in their annual reports. 
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 Miller and Piotroski (2000) instead considered both earnings and sales forecasts, as well as 
examining more explanatory variables were examined and the results were more informative. 
Using  logistic regression they found that disclosure is positively associated with  the following: 
managers’ prior disclosure histories, strong and more persistent earnings news, firms operating in 
high litigation industries, and strong institutional ownership. Johnson et al. (2001) instead 
examined the impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on the disclosure of 
earnings and sales forecasts for 1064 high technological US firms in 1994 and 1996 and found  
that the Act increased the number of firms which issued forecasts. However, it also appears that 
litigation risk is a significant driver of the voluntary disclosure of earnings forecasts and that they 
are used to help adjust investors’ expectations downwards (Skinner, 2004; Kasznik and Lev, 
1995) 
 
In contrast, Wasley and Wu (2006) in a study of the determinants of cash flow forecasts find that 
cash flow forecasts are more frequently provided when the news is good, and that such cash flow 
forecasts are used in particular to mitigate the bad news in earnings forecasts or to add credibility 
to either particularly good earnings forecasts or to forecasts made by younger firms who may 
have less credibility in the market place. Additionally, the results revealed a positive relationship 
between management cash flow forecast and earnings volatility, capital intensity, firm size, the 
existence of analyst cash flow forecasts, and management earnings forecasts. However, the 
management cash flow forecast is negatively related to Altman’s Z-scores. 
   
The current study extends this work and offers a new perspective by considering the disclosure 
of cash flow information not only in the economic context of the firm but also in its wider social, 
political and institutional context. Specifically, it argues that the voluntary disclosure of cash 
flow forecast is subject to two types of influence. The first of these involves managers’ 
incentives to produce relevant information to debt or stock market participants to reduce 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts  (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Petersen and 
Plenborg, 2006; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007). However, while information asymmetry has 
proved to be successful in explaining many disclosure choices it is only a limited explanation, in 
that it ignores many other potential influences on behaviour. Specifically, accounting practices, 
including disclosure decisions, may also be shaped by external factors, in particular institutional 
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factors, such that companies operating in a similar environment are faced with similar demands 
with respect to what may be deemed to be appropriate behaviour. Particularly important here is 
institutional isomorphism which explains how the environment permeates organisations, 
including firms, mainly via political and cultural processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Moll et 
al, 2006)  
 
Institutional theory has primarily been to explain organisations’ management accounting 
(Bergevarn et al 1995, Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Modell, 2003) audit practices (Carpenter & 
Dirsmith, 1993) and the adoption of particular accounting systems (Carpenter & Feroz, 1992, 
2001; Neu and Ocampo, 2007). While there have been few studies using it to explain disclosure 
decisions, it has been used to explain certain social responsibility disclosures within the annual 
reports (Unerman and Bennett, 2004). The theoretical framework applied in this study therefore 
provides a broader and arguably considerably richer and more informative understanding of the 
factors affecting managers’ decisions to disclose cash flow forecasts. 
 
 
2.1 Analyst Following 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Botosan (1997) found that firms with more informative 
disclosures have larger analyst following. Previous research on forward-looking information, 
such as Walker and Tsalta (2001) and Athanasakou and Hussainey (2009) showed that forward-
looking disclosures are also positively related to a larger analyst following. This may be at least 
partially because information disclosure makes their task easier, so encouraging them to follow 
the company. Thus, Bozzolan et al. (2009) for example, found evidence that the disclosure of 
verifiable financial information increases accuracy and reduces the dispersion of financial 
analysts’ forecasts. Alternatively or in addition, it may be that companies that are under more 
external scrutiny can reap more benefits from managing the information flows to the market and 
arguably thereby reduce information asymmetry. However, institutional theory also posits a 
positive relationship between analyst following and disclosure. For example, Healy and Palepu 
(2001) argued that financial analysts are viewed as strategy advisors to the company that they are 
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analysing and thus are viewed in a manner akin to professional consultants. Based on normative 
isomorphism in institutional theory, companies will tend to comply with suggestions or 
recommendations of external institutions including both professional bodies and consultants 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
In contrast to the findings that analyst following is related to forward information disclosures, 
Clarkson et al. (1999), Miller and Piotroski (2000), and Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) found no 
significant relationship between forward-looking information and analysts followings. However, 
despite this, based on the above theoretical arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: There is a positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow 
forecasts and analyst following.  
 
2.2 Industry Behaviour 
Firm behaviour can be influenced by social networks, or by a set of relationships in an industry 
(Granovetter, 1985). Network relationships distribute norms, values, and procedures as signals, 
through social groups suggesting the right thing to do (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Pfarrer et 
al. (2008) argued that companies experience network pressure through personnel exchanges, 
company boards, and sharing the same auditors. Thus, while normative isomorphism suggests 
that companies might disclose information because they think they should, or that this is a good 
thing to do so, or because it is suggested by or endorsed by professional bodies, external 
consultants or others in positions of power or importance, mimetic isomorphism suggests that 
firms will similarly follow the practices of firms they perceive to be leaders or more successful 
than themselves. Such behaviour may in turn either help them to gain the same success or 
prominence or, if not, the firm will  be seen by outsiders as following policies that are similarly 
being carried out by successful firms (Scott, 1995).  
 
Institutional theory thus suggests that the existence of a dominant firm with a high level of 
disclosure in a particular industry will encourage other firms in the same industry to provide 
additional information. In other words, organisations follow the internal structures and 
procedures of other organisations in the same group; and in turn industry patterns emerge with 
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some industries typically showing different or higher levels of disclosures than others. 
(Empirically for example, Haveman (1983) found that organisations imitate other successful 
organisations (whether these are large or profitable) in the same industry while Botosan and 
Harris (2000) found that such imitation included the adoption of  similar disclosure policies.  
 
Looking more specifically at management cash flow forecasts, Wasley and Wu (2006) found 
significant and positive relationship between the release of such forecasts and the disclosure 
practices of other firms in the same industry. Based on the above arguments, and consistently 
with institutional theory, it can be hypothesised that:  
H2A: There is a positive association between voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts 
and industry behaviour. 
 
While mimetic isomorphism suggests that disclosure may exhibit industry specific patterns, 
disclosure may also be used by a company to signal the fact that it is a leader in the industry. 
Thus, a second alternative hypothesis is also tested 
   
H2B: There is a positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow 
forecasts and industry leadership. 
 
2.3 Change in OFR Regulations 
Based on institutional coercive isomorphism, external factors such as government regulation 
force organisations to adopt internal structures and procedures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Not only might this alter the costs of any associated voluntary disclosures but organisations may 
view regulatory pressures as a force or persuasion to confirm expected behaviour (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Greening and Gray, 1994)  so encouraging them to increase voluntary disclosure.  
 
In considering the relationship between regulated and unregulated disclosures, Dye (1986) taking 
instead an information asymmetry perspective, modelled various cases, and concluded that 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures are complement to each other. Dye (1986) theoretically 
argued that if a company already discloses mandatory information, then the marginal impact on 
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competitive advantage from additional information might be reduced. Chow et al. (1996) 
provided experimental evidence consistent with Dye (1986) while Xiao et al. (2004) pointed out 
that mandatory disclosure creates a favourable environment and adds credibility to voluntary 
disclosures so encouraging them.  
 
In regards to the change in FL regulations, the government issued statutory statement in April 
2005 which introduced the OFR requirement. All listed companies are required to produce a 
statutory OFR for the reporting period beginning on or after 1 April 2005. The OFR can be 
defined as: 
“a narrative explanation, provided in or accompanying the annual report, of the main trends 
and factors underlying the development, performance and position of an entity during the 
financial year covered by the financial statements and those which are likely to affect the entity’s 
future development, performance and position” [RS: OFR,  Para 3] (ASB, 2006).  
 
Thus while the OFR did not mandate the provision of cash flow statements, the requirement to 
provide information on any trends or factors which likely to affect future performance or position 
may well have encouraged the voluntary release of cash flow forecasts. 
 
Unfortunately, the government cancelled the mandatory disclosure on 12 January 2006 and 
issued a statement of best practice, which is intended to have persuasive rather mandatory force. 
This study focuses on 2004-2006 period, since this time presents an important period of changes 
in regulation that might affect the level of voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecast information. 
Thus, consistently with institutional theory and previous studies, it can be hypothesised that: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow 
forecasts and the status of  the OFR regulations. 
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2.4 Operating Cash Flows  
Hutton et al. (2003) and Baginski et al. (2004) argued that information asymmetry increased 
when management earnings guidance1 is either above or below the consensus and hence 
additional disclosure help investors to interpret the news in management’s earnings guidance to 
avoid surprising investors. Hutton et al. (2003) similarly suggested that managers provide 
additional information to increase the credibility of good earnings news when this is driven by 
underlying cash flow rather than accounting discretion, while Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) found instead that non-GAAP earnings measures are more likely 
to be produced for firms with bad news.  
While Adhikari and Duru (2006) found a positive but insignificant the relation between cash 
flow to net income ratio and disclosure of free cash flow, Wasley and Wu (2006) found a 
significant positive relationship between changes in operating cash flow deflated by lagged total 
asset and disclosure of a cash flow forecast. Therefore, based on the above discussions and 
consistent with prior research, a positive relation is expected between cash flows and cash flow 
information. . It can be therefore hypothesised. 
H4: There is positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts 
and operating cash flow to lagged assets. 
 
2.5 Leverage 
Companies with high debt in their capital structure are more likely to disclose additional 
information to reduce agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Disclosures of additional 
information may act to confirm that they have not violated any conditions of the contract 
                                                 
1 Earnings guidance is referred to the comments management provides about their expectation of the earnings news 
and that news about competitive effects across firms. 
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covenant. Foster (1986). This is turn decreasies the borrower’s risk of default, in turn reducing 
the cost of capital (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). 
 
Leverage is widely used in prior studies to examine the determinants of corporate disclosure. For 
example, O’Sullivan et al. (2008),  and Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) demonstrated a positive 
relationship between the leverage ratio and the extent of forward-looking information. Although 
Celik et al. (2006) and Lim et al. (2007) failed to find any support for this.  
 
However, despite these two papers, based both on information asymmetry theory and prior 
studies, a positive relationship is hypothesised between disclosure of FL information and 
leverage. Thus, it can be hypothesised that: 
H5: There is positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts 
and leverage.  
 
2.6 Performance 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) highlighted that when the rate of return is high, managers try to 
disclose more information to support the continuance of their position and remuneration while 
Ross (1979) hypothesised that companies with good news are more likely to disclose voluntary 
information. Milgrom (1981) similarly demonstrated that even if disclosures are costless, 
external users will interpret non-disclosure as implying bad news. Verrecchia (1983) and Dye 
(1985) support this, finding that managers with good news provide additional information. 
However, Skinner (1994) and Kaznik and Lev (1995) demonstrated that companies with bad 
news are more likely to provide additional information in order to enhance accountability and 
reduce litigation risk.  
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Prior studies have used performance as determinant of disclosure of forward-looking 
information, but with mixed result. For example, Athanasakou and Hussainey (2009) found a 
negative relationship between performance and the level of forward-looking information. 
Whereas, Walker and Tsalta, 2001; Kent and Ung (2003), Hossain et al. (2005), and Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2008) found no relationship, and Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007) found that accuracy of 
forward-looking information was increased for profitable firm. Therefore, a non-directional 
hypothesis is examined: 
 
H6: There is an association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts and 
firm performance.  
2.7 Blockholding 
Substantial shareholders are expected to have both the power and the incentives to monitor 
managers’ behaviours (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) so firms with concentred ownership will 
tend to have less agency costs and less incentive to provide additional information (Cahan and 
Hossain, 1996). In contrast, Byrd et al. (1992) highlighted that large shareholdings have stronger 
incentives to monitor managerial behaviour and so may demand more disclosures. 
 
However, prior studies have found mixed results regarding the importance of blockholder as an 
explanation for voluntary disclosure. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Mitchell et al. (1995) 
and Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) found a negative relation between voluntary disclosure and 
blockholder ownership while Eng and Mak (2003) found no relationship and Hossain et al. 
(1994) and Hufang and Jianguo (2007) found a positive relationship.  
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Similarly previous research on forward-looking information is inconclusive. O’Sullivan et al. 
(2008) found a positive but insignificant relation between FL information and blockholder 
ownerships whilst Cahan and Hossain (1996) found a negative. So, based on theory and 
consistent with previous studies, it can be hypothesised that: 
 
H7: There is an association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts and 
blockholder ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8  Growth opportunities 
 
Growth companies have greater potential for information asymmetry and they are more likely to 
reduce information asymmetry through voluntary disclosures (Core, 2001), This has been 
supported empirically by Hossain and Ahmed (2000). 
 
While Mason and Merton (1985) indicated that growth opportunities consists of new projects, 
acquisitions of other firms, new brands, replacement of exciting assets and expansion projects,  
Lev and Stefano (2003) instead believed that the major driver of company’s growth opportunities 
is intellectual capital, which consists of innovation information, communication technologies, 
networks and alliance, high quality human resources and management processes. Barth et al. 
(2001) employed the market to book value ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities as this ratio 
provides a measure of unrecorded intangible assets which in turn are a major determinant of the 
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amount of growth opportunities. These companies typically also have a higher amount of 
information asymmetry (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007).  
 
Hossain et al. (2005) showed that growth opportunities measured by either market to book value 
of assets and market to book value of equity is positively related to the extent of forward-looking 
disclosures while O’Sullivan et al. (2008) demonstrated that high growth companies publish 
more FL information to alleviate information asymmetry and Athanasakou and Hussainey (2009) 
showed that book to market value is negatively related to voluntary disclosure of forward-
looking information. However, while Cahan and Hossain (1996), Walker and Tsalta (2001) and 
Eng and Mak (2003) all hypothesised a positive relations between growth opportunities and 
forward-looking information, but they found no significant evidence.  
Despite these insignificant empirical results, it is hypothesised that high growth companies are 
more likely to provide additional information to indicate their success and management expertise 
and so maximise shareholder value in the market. It can therefore be hypothesised that: 
 
H8: There is positive association between the voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecasts 
and growth opportunities.  
 
2.9 Control variables 
 
In addition to the relationships hypothesised above, a number of control variables are also 
employed. The size of the company is measured in terms of sales. Also considered are cross-
listing, in particular listing in the USA, the year end and the existence of a profit forecast. Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2008) documented that the extent of forward-looking information is positively 
related to a firm’s other forms of disclosure. Cao et al. (2007) found that management earnings 
forecasts and cash flow forecasts support each other by reducing the forecast bias.  
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Sample  
Table 1 presents the sample construction process. The population consists of the top 500 UK 
listed firms by total market capitalization as listed by the Financial Times UK 500 on 30 March 
2007.. After removing financial and investment companies and AIM companies because of the 
very different operating or institutional environments they face and missing data, the final 
sample consists of balanced data of 230 companies2 (690 firm-year observations for 2004-2006).  
 
 
 
Table 1 Sample Selection Criteria 
 Firms per Year Firm-Year Observations 
Top 500 UK listed firms by market capitalization 
(as listed by Financial Times on 30 March 2007) 
for the 2004-2006 period. 
500 1500 
Financial and Investment companies 128 384 
FTSE AIM 100 36 108 
Unavailable in DataStream 50 150 
Missing Annual reports 15 45 
Problem in annual report conversion3 11 33 
Observations with missing financial data 20 60 
Outliers 10 30 
Total final sample 230 690 
 
3.2 Variables employed  
One important issue in studies of this type is the issue of how to locate and measure relevant 
disclosure as typically forward looking information, including cash flow forecasts, are contained 
in the narrative sections of reports and often are untitled. Thus, most of the previous studies of 
forward looking disclosures have used relatively small samples, due to the difficulty in 
                                                 
2 The exclusion of a firm in one year for any reason automatically leads to the exclusion of the same firm from the 
other years. 
3 All annual reports are converted to text files so they are readable by QSR NVivo 8 with the exception of 11 annual 
reports that could not be converted to text files. In these reports, annual reports are saved as image and when we 
convert these reports into text files, we got word that are difficult to read either manually or by the computer 
software. 
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performing manual content analysis. However, recently, explanatory studies have increasingly 
employed automated content analysis to score forward looking narratives (Hussainey et al., 
2003; Houssainey and Walker 2009; Mouselli et al, 2012; Schleicher et al 2007). A similar 
approach was taken by Wasley and Wu (2006) when to measure the incidence of cash flow 
forecasts. Specifically, they used a keyword search to identify forecasts in press releases. A 
keyword search was used to find the term ‘cash flow’ in close proximity to terms such as 
‘predicts’, ‘forecasts’, ‘sees’, ‘projects’, or ‘puts’  on the Factiva database.. 
 
To permit the use of a relatively large sample, the current study similarly employs computerised 
content analysis using QSR NVivo 8. This not only enables the automation of a large sample of 
annual reports in a relatively short time but it also reduces the level of subjectivity inherent in 
manual content analysis. The annual report  narrative sections which are considered to be highly 
standardised, i.e. directors’ reports, corporate governance report, remuneration report, list of 
content, list of directors and advisors, statement of directors’ responsibilities, financial history 
and financial summary, and shareholder information were converted into standard text format 
files and imported into NVivo. This is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Walker and Tsalta, 
2001; Hussainey et al., 2003; Beattie et al., 2004) and leaves the narrative, largely voluntary 
section, such as, chairman’s, CEO’s and  financial director’s statements, operating and financial 
review, business review or review of the operation, community and people, and environmental 
report.  
A keyword search was used to identify cash flow forecasts in these sections of the annual 
reports. The disclosure scores are calculated in three steps. The first step requires the 
identification of text unit with forward-looking keywords. In this step, text-search queries are 
used to automate the analysis of narrative sections of annual reports using a list of forward-
looking keywords as reported in table 2. 
 
Table 2 List of Forward-Looking Keywords 
Number Keywords Number Keywords 
 
1. Accelerate 19. Look forward 
2. Anticipate 20. Next 
3, Await 21. Near term, medium term 
4. Coming[financial] year[s] 22. Optimistic 
5. Coming months 23. Outlook 
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6. Confidence, Confident 24. Plan 
7. Convince 25. Predict 
8. Future 26. Remain 
9. Possible 27. Renew 
10. Estimate 28. Probable 
11. Aim 29. Opportunity 
12. Expect 30. Commitment 
13. Forecast 31. Further 
14. Forthcoming 32. Chance 
15. Hope 33. Well placed, Well positioned 
16. Intend, Intention 34. Year[s] ahead 
17. Likely, Unlikely 35. 2006/2007, 2006-2007, 2006/07 
18. Look ahead 36. 2007, 2008….2030 
 
Hussainey et al.’s (2003) list was used as a preliminary list of forward-looking keywords. This 
was then modified and potential keywords added based upon an initial  manual content analysis 
of 30 annual reports (for example, “possible”, “probable”, “opportunity”, “further”, “chance”, 
“future”, “commitment”, “near term” and “medium term”) while others were instead excluded 
due to their very low frequency of occurrence (for example, “envisage”, “eventual”, “novel”, 
“scope for”, “scope to”, and “shortly”). The next step is the use of text search queries to find 
cash flow keywords. The final step was performed through the use of advanced coding queries in 
order to find forward-looking keywords that were, following Waslay and Wu (2006), within 
seven words of the cash flow keywords.  The disclosure score was then converted to 1 for 
companies with cash flow forecasts and 0 otherwise, regardless of the number of forecasts or 
whether they were qualitative or quantitative. 
 
Table 3 shows a list of independent variables as discussed above and their proxies. 
 
Table 3 Independent Variables and their Measures 
Independent 
Variables 
Code Measures 
Institutional Variables 
 
Analyst following 
 
ANFL 
 
The number of analyst following the company in FACTSET 
Excel Connect Database at the end of t. 
   
Industry behaviour 1 INDBEH Percentage of other companies in the same industry with a cash 
flow forecast in the same year. 
 
 
Industry behaviour 2 LEAD A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if firm i market share is 
above 1/N (N = number of companies in the industry) and 0 
otherwise 
17 
 
   
Change in OFR Reg. REG A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm i year-ends 
during changes in OFR regulation (1 April 2005-12 January 
2006), and 0 otherwise. 
Information Asymmetry Variables 
   
Operating cash flow 
to lagged total assets 
OCF Firm i’s cash in operating activities at the end of t (DS 1015) 
divided by total assets at the end of t-1 (DS 392). 
 
Leverage 
 
 
LEV 
 
Firm i’s total debt at the end of t (DS 1301) to total assets at the 
end of t (DS 392). 
 
Performance ROA Firm i’s published after tax profit at the end of t (DS 623) 
divided by total assets at the end of t (DS 392). 
   
Blockholding of 5% 
or more 
NOSHST The percentage of total shares in issue held strategically at the 
end of t (DS NOSHST). 
 
Growth 
opportunities 
BVMV Book value of equity to market value of equity 
 
Control variables 
  
 
Company size 
 
Size 
 
 
The natural logarithm of total sales at the end of t (DS 104). 
Cross-listing CrossList A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the firm i is cross-listing 
on the US NYSE or NASDAQ, and 0 otherwise. 
   
Year-end 2004 YearEnd04 A dichotomous variable equals 1 for the 2004 year-end firm 
observations, and 0 otherwise.  
Year-end 2005 YearEnd05 A dichotomous variable equals 1 for the 2005 year-end firm 
observations, and 0 otherwise 
Profit forecasts PROFT A categorical variable equals to 1 if the firms disclose profit 
forecasts, either qualitative or quantitative, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. The Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
This section reports on the disclosure of cash flow forecasts. Table 3 reports the frequency 
distribution of cash flow forecasts by year; with 290 cash flow forecasts during the three years, 
2004-2006. However, the frequency varies quite considerably, with the least occurring in 2005 
(N = 76, 26.2%), and the most a year later in 2006 (N = 120, 41.4%), when ASB issued a 
statement of best practice for OFR instead of the compulsory regulation of OFR in 2005. This 
change affects the audit of the information, as the audit of voluntary information is not as strict 
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as the audit of mandatory information. This means that the litigation risk is likely to be less and 
this may have encouraged the increase in disclosure. 
 
Table 3 Frequency of Cash Flow Forecasts per Year 
Year Firms with management 
cash flow forecasts 
Percentage of firms with  
cash flow forecasts 
2004 94 32.4 
2005 76 26.2 
2006 120 41.4 
Total 290 100 
This Table reports  on the presence of cash flow forecasts in the narrative sections of annual reports.  
 
 
Table 4 instead presents the frequency distribution of cash flow forecasts by industry  over the 
study period. Industry definitions are based on the Industry Classification Benchmark system as 
given by the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The Table presents the proportion of companies 
with/without cash flow forecasts within each industry across the period of the study.  
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Frequency and Percentage of Disclosing/Non-disclosing Companies by  Industry 
 
Panel (A) 2004 
Industry description ICB Code Frequency Percentage 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Oil and gas 0001 4 9 31 69 
Basic material 1000 5 4 56 44 
Industrial 2000 31 56 36 64 
Consumer good 3000 11 10 52 48 
Health care 4000 3 8 27 73 
Consumer service 5000 28 33 46 54 
Telecommunication 6000 4 0 100 00 
Utilities 7000 3 5 37 63 
Technology 9000 5 11 31 69 
Panel (A) 2005 
Industry description ICB Code Frequency Percentage 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Oil and gas 0001 4 9 31 69 
Basic material 1000 2 7 22 78 
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Industrial 2000 25 62 29 71 
Consumer good 3000 8 13 38 62 
Health care 4000 2 9 18 82 
Consumer service 5000 23 38 38 62 
Telecommunication 6000 4 0 100 00 
Utilities 7000 4 4 50 50 
Technology 9000 4 12 25 75 
Panel (A) 2006 
Industry description ICB Code Frequency Percentage 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Disclose Non-
disclose 
Oil and gas 0001 9 4 69 31 
Basic material 1000 4 5 44 56 
Industrial 2000 52 35 60 40 
Consumer good 3000 10 11 48 52 
Health care 4000 5 6 45 55 
Consumer service 5000 26 35 43 57 
Telecommunication 6000 3 1 75 25 
Utilities 7000 3 5 37 63 
Technology 9000 8 8 50 50 
 
 
This shows some quite major industry differences. Thus, for example, in 2004 and 2005 all the 
telecommunications companies disclose forecast information. While only one-third or less of 
companies in the oil and gas and technology industries report forecast information in the same 
period. 
4.2 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Pooled logistic regression analysis is conducted using the Limdep 7 econometric software 
package (Greene, 1995) in order to investigate the factors that affect managers’ decisions to 
voluntarily disclose cash flow forecasts among UK non-financial companies. However, before 
conducting the regression analysis, the data set must comply with the necessary assumptions; in 
particular there should be no multicollinearity or heteroscedasticity. Field (2005) suggested 
simply running a linear regression analysis using the same outcome and predictors to obtain the 
VIF to check for a multicollinearity problem. The VIF values for all independent variables are 
less than 3.0, implying there is no problem.  However, the leadership variable resulted in a 
significant problem of heteroscedasticity. Following Williams (2009), the study therefore  used 
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the  “Heteroscedastic Logit Model for Binary Data”  in order to correct for this problem,  as 
presented in Table 5. 
 
The pooled logistic regression model is as follows:  
CF= β0 + β1 ANFL + β2A INDBEH + β2B LEAD + β3 REG + β4 OCF + β5 LEV + β6 ROA + 
β7 NOSHST + β8 BVMV + β9 size + β10 CrossList + β11 YearEnd04+β12 YearEnd05+ β13 
PROFT + е 
 
 
Where: CF  = disclosure of cash flow forecast,  0 = no disclosure, 1= disclosure; ANFL = analyst 
following; INDBEH = industry behaviour; LEAD = leadership; REG= change in OFR 
regulation; OCF = operating cash flow; LEV = leverage; ROA = performance; NOSHST = 
blockholding of 5% or more; BVMV = book value to market valueSize = company size; ;  
CrossList = cross-listing; YearEnd04 = year-end in 2004; YearEnd05 = year-end in 2005; 
PROFT = profit forecast; е = error term. 
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Table 5. Heteroscedastic Logit Model for Binary Data 
Variables Expected sign Coefficients B /St.Er. VIF P-value 
Constant  -4.962 -3.540  0.0004*** 
ANFL + 0.006 0.625 2.036 
0.5317 
INDBEH + 4.732 3.666 1.136 0.0002*** 
LEAD + 0.201 0.589 1.737 
0.5555 
REG + 0.515 1.272 1.244 
0.2030 
OCF + 4.496 3.239 2.791 0.0012*** 
LEV + 0.376 0.774 1.667 
0.4390 
ROA ? -4.967 -2.956 2.112 0.0031*** 
NOSHST ? 0.001 0.732 2.328 
0.4644 
BVMV - -.0139 -0.034 1.145 
0.9731 
Size + 0.127 1.646 1.720 0.0997* 
CrossList ? 2.177 4.958 1.205 0.0000*** 
YearEnd04 ? -0.059 -0.178 1.771 0.8591 
YearEnd05 ? -0.216 -0.560 2.981 0.5754 
PROFT + 0.488 1.011 1.136 0.3120 
  
Heteroscedastic Logit Model for Binary Data 
 Disturbance Variance Terms 
LEAD  0.539 1.813  0.0699* 
 
 
  
Chi-squared = 110.965                  Significance level = 0.000 
  Restricted  Log Likelihood Function = -430.124 
Log Likelihood Function = -374.642 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
* Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
The model is highly significant (χ2 = 110.97 P-Value = 0.000), with  industry behaviour, OCF 
regulation, performance or ROA, and cross listing all significantly related (at 1%) to voluntary 
disclosure of cash flow forecast. ,  
 
The result of pooled logistic regression documents, as predicted, industry behaviour is positively 
and significantly consistent with mimetic isomorphism in that companies try to copy the 
disclosure practices of other companies in the same industry. This result is also consistent with 
Wasley and Wu (2006). The profit forecast, (B = 1.011), while of the correct sign, is 
insignificantly related to the disclosure of cash flow forecasts. This result is inconsistent with 
previous studies which document a positive relationship between FL information and a firm’s 
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other forms of disclosure (e.g., Wasley and Wu, 2006; Cao et al., 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2008). 
 
Additionally, the results presented in Table 6 show that performance (B = -2.956) is negatively 
and significantly related to voluntary disclosure of cash flow forecast, suggesting that  companies 
disclose good news in cash to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings. This result is 
also consistent with Wasley and Wu (2006) and Adhikari and Duru (2006). In addition, OCF (B 
= 3.239) is positively and significantly related to cash flow forecast. This result is inconsistent 
with institutionalism in that it was expected that increased regulation mighth also encourage 
increased voluntary information. However, it does suggest that litigation risk might instead be 
important.. Also, the result indicates a positive and significant relationship between the control 
variables of both company size and cross-listing variables and cash flow forecast at the 10% 
level and the 1% level, respectively.  
 
Additional regression models are performed using different proxies for independent variables in 
order to ensure that multivariate results are robust to a different combination of independent 
variables proxies. In short, sensitivity and additional analyses identify quite similar inferences to 
the primary regression analysis model; this confirms the robustness of the regression results. 
 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The objective of this study was to examine the determinants of the issuance of voluntary 
management cash flow forecasts over the period 2004-2006. Automated content analysis using 
QSR NVivo 8 is used to find the cash flow forecasts in voluntary sections of annual reports. The 
results show that there has been an increase in the issuance of cash flow forecasts for the year 
2006, when ASB issued a voluntary statement of best practice for OFR regulation instead of the 
compulsory regulation in 2005. This implies that behaviour is influenced by the cost of violation 
of statuary regulation which results in a higher litigation risk, leading to the disclosure of less 
forward looking information.  
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The result of pooled logistic regression model reveals that agency theory explanations of 
corporate behaviour can be usefully supplemented by consideration of the social, political and 
market environment in which the corporation operates. Specifically here, industry behaviour is 
an important factor in explaining managers’ incentives to disclose cash flow forecasts, which is 
consistent with mimetic isomorphism, as institutional theory suggests. Furthermore, the results 
document that disclosure of cash flow forecasts is positively and significantly related to 
operating cash flow, but it is negatively and significantly related to performance and competition 
rate. Furthermore, corporate size and cross-listing are found to be positively and significantly 
related to disclosure of cash flow forecasts. This result implies that cash flow forecasts are 
subject to alternative proxies of information asymmetry and institutional characteristics. 
 
Our findings have important implications. It helps to inform regulators the incentives for issuing cash 
flow forecasts by UK firms. This information is needed when studying the cost-benefit analysis of 
increased disclosures. In addition, our paper has important implications for academic research. It 
produces a new method for calculating cash flow forecasts in annual report narratives. Researchers 
can follow our method and then study the economic consequences of cash flow forecasts disclosures 
in the annual report narratives. Finally, in order to increase our understanding of institutional 
characteristics, future research could be conducted to determine the variability in cash flow 
forecasts across different European countries, since country factors as well as legal and 
regulatory authorities may play an important role in determining reporting practices due to 
differences in litigation risk between countries.  
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